The end of the Net Zero consensus

Kemi Badenoch’s call to scrap the Climate Change Act matters far more than the headlines suggest.

The Westminster consensus on energy and climate policy - which has been unchallenged for 17 years - is finally dead. That consensus acted as the praetorian guard for an aggressive and disproportionate form of national decarbonisation to meet a global target. It insulated policy from proper scrutiny, locked in subsidies by stealth, and kept important public debate off-limits.

But reality has finally caught up. Years of high energy bills driven by inefficient renewables, job losses across energy-intensive industries, and the rise of Nigel Farage’s Reform Party have forced the Conservative Party to confront the obvious truth: the green agenda is not a win-win for UK PLC.

With the consensus now over, we enter a new phase. Three big changes will follow.

1. The political economy of Net Zero will unravel.
This won’t happen immediately, but billions in contracts and subsidies — including Allocation Round 7 (the government’s current auction of renewable subsidies) — now look politically exposed. This is terrible news for Ed Miliband’s Clean Power 2030 mission. Investors are not just thinking about the next four years under Labour; they are assessing the durability of the UK’s green energy framework in the long term. Those foundations were already looking shaky with Reform’s policy. But without the Conservatives, that durability is finally gone.

2. Public attitudes will shift.
Voters back Net Zero in principle, but not the trade-offs. That gap exists because Westminster deliberately obscured the costs through levies on bills and opaque market interventions. This was aided by a distorted media debate that treated Net Zero as an inevitability rather than a policy choice. With the consensus now broken, those hidden costs can no longer be concealed. The clear link between high bills and renewables will be made, and the political debate will change.

Polls already show that the public demands immediate action on high energy bills. People aalready blame the government and the data shows that Putin’s war in Ukraine no longer serves as a credible excuse. Badenoch’s shift, along with Farage, means there will be nowhere to hide: ministers will have to justify why Britain has the highest electricity prices in the developed world.

3. Energy policy competition returns to Westminster.
With the break-up of the SW1 climate cartel, energy policy becomes competitive again. The Conservatives and Reform will now race to offer the most ambitious and credible alternative to the failed Net Zero consensus - just as we have seen on borders and migration. Labour and the Lib Dems will be forced to respond, particularly on the cost of living, and to explain why Britain has the highest industrial electricity prices in the developed world while sitting only around the IEA average for industrial gas.

Finally, for Britain, it is good news. At last, we may see domestic politics functioning as it should do and an honest debate about energy, affordability and national security. This is a debate that is long overdue. For this, Kemi Badenoch should be applauded.